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T
here has been growing 
recognition in the international 
community that health should 
be considered a human right, a right 
enshrined by several international 
treaties. Much less attention has been 
paid, however, to the ensuing legal 
obligation to provide international 
assistance.
Kenneth Roth, director of 
Human Rights Watch, provided a 
rare comment endorsing the legal 
obligation to provide international 
assistance for health [1]. At the 
same time, he also underscored two 
problems associated with fulﬁ  lling 
this obligation: shared responsibility 
and progressive realisation (i.e., the 
obligation is not immediate but takes 
time to fulﬁ  l) [1].
The problem of progressive 
realisation lies in the acknowledgement 
that all economic, social, and cultural 
rights cannot be fully realised in a short 
period of time. This allows states to 
claim that they are doing or have done 
everything they can.
This problem has been partially 
addressed by the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“the Committee”), created to 
monitor states’ achievements on the 
realisation of the rights recognised 
in the Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (“the Covenant”) 
[2]. The Committee has stated that “a 
minimum core obligation to ensure 
the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of each of the 
rights is incumbent upon every State 
party” [3]. The Committee stressed that, 
in terms of the right to health, “a State 
party cannot, under any circumstances 
whatsoever, justify its non-compliance 
with the core obligations…which are 
non-derogeable” [4]. The realisation 
of the minimum essential level is 
understood to be immediate rather 
than progressive.
The obligation to provide assistance 
for health is further circumvented 
by a second problem: that of shared 
responsibility. Poor states can blame 
rich states for not honouring their 
obligation to provide assistance, thus 
leaving poor states with insufﬁ  cient 
means to meet their core obligations. 
Rich states can blame poor states—and 
each other—for not doing enough.
A world health insurance could solve 
that problem by deﬁ  ning rights and 
duties for both rich and poor states. 
Wishful thinking? Maybe not. The 
basic requirements for a world health 
insurance have already been developed 
in theory and even in practice to a 
certain extent.
A world health insurance would 
shed different light on the problem 
of sustainability. Several effective 
health interventions are branded as 
“unsustainable” in poor countries, 
because national health budgets 
cannot afford them [5]. The option 
of substantially and permanently 
increasing national health budgets 
through international assistance 
is rarely considered. The creation 
of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (“the Global 
Fund”) demonstrates the merits of 
ambitious thinking: the provision 
of antiretroviral therapy (ART) to 
people living with AIDS, previously 
dismissed as unsustainable, became 
widely accepted as soon as the Global 
Fund provided a long-term funding 
perspective. Other health interventions 
deserve a similar approach.
A Practical Framework for 
a World Health Insurance
The underlying principle of health 
insurance is the willingness to share 
health risks and the burden of health 
care. In national health insurance 
schemes, duty-bearing individuals pay 
a fair contribution; rights-holding 
individuals receive assistance in 
accordance with their health-care 
needs.
Transposed to a world health 
insurance, rich states would pay a fair 
contribution and poor states would 
have a right to assistance according 
to the health-care needs that they are 
unable to ﬁ  nance themselves. The 
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Figure 1. Fund the Gap 
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Table 1. Low-Income Countries’ Additional ODA for Health Needs to Achieve US$35 per Person per Year Government Health 
Expenditure
A. Low-Income 
Countries According 
to World Bank 
Classiﬁ  cation in 
August 2006
B. Government 
Health Expenditure, 
per Person per 
Year, Exchange 
Rate, in US$, 2004 
Figurea 
C. Government 
Health 
Expenditure, 
Percent of Total 
Government 
Expenditure, 
2004 Figurea
D. Government 
Health Expenditure, 
per Person per Year, 
Exchange Rate, 
in US$, if Health 
Expenditure Would 
Be 15% of Total 
Expenditure (B×15/
C)
E. Additional ODA for 
Health, per Person 
per Year, Needed 
to Achieve US$35 
per Person per Year 
Government Health 
Expenditure, in US$ 
(35-D; Adjusted to 
Zero if Value <0)
F. Population, 
in Millionsb
 G. Additional 
ODA for Health, 
in Total, Needed 
to Achieve US$35 
per Person per 
Year Government 
Health 
Expenditure, in 
US$ millions (E×F)
Afghanistan 4 6.9 8.7 26.3 29.7 781.24
Bangladesh 5 6.1 12.3 22.7 141.8 3,219.56
Benin 11 8.3 19.9 15.1 8.4 127.01
Bhutan 10 7.5 20.0 15.0 2.2 33.00
Burkina Faso 11 12.6 13.1 21.9 13.2 289.14
Burundi 1 2 7.5 27.5 7.6 209.00
Cambodia 6 11.8 7.6 27.4 14.1 385.96
Central African Republic 5 15.4 4.9 30.1 4 120.52
Chad 7 9.5 11.1 23.9 9.8 234.68
Comoros 7 6.9 15.2 19.8 0.8 15.83
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 4 3.8 31.3 57.6 1,800.00
Côte d’Ivoire 8 4.6 26.1 8.9 18.2 162.22
Eritrea 4 4.2 14.3 20.7 4.4 91.14
Ethiopia 3 9.4 4.8 30.2 77.4 2,338.47
Gambia, The 9 13.7 9.9 25.1 1.5 37.72
Ghana 6 4.5 20.0 15.0 22.1 331.50
Guinea 3 4.8 9.4 25.6 9.4 240.88
Guinea-Bissau 3 4.4 10.2 24.8 1.6 39.64
Haiti 13 23.8 8.2 26.8 8.5 227.86
India 7 3.6 29.2 5.8 1103.37 6,436.33
Kenya 8 7.3 16.4 18.6 34.3 636.66
Korea, Dem. Rep. 0.5 7.2 1.0 34.0 22.5 764.06
Kyrgyz Republic 9 10 13.5 21.5 5.3 113.95
Lao PDR 4 6.2 9.7 25.3 5.9 149.40
Liberia 3 14.3 3.1 31.9 3.3 105.12
Madagascar 5 10.7 7.0 28.0 18.6 520.63
Malawi 5 8.9 8.4 26.6 12.9 342.79
Mali 10 9.2 16.3 18.7 13.5 252.39
Mauritania 14 11.7 17.9 17.1 3.1 52.86
Mongolia 25 10.1 37.1 0.0 2.6 0.00
Mozambique 8 9.1 13.2 21.8 19.8 431.90
Myanmar 97 2.7 538.9 0.0 50.5 0.00
Nepal 4 9.1 6.6 28.4 27.1 769.82
Niger 5 12.3 6.1 28.9 14 404.63
Nigeria 7 3.5 30.0 5.0 128.7 643.50
Pakistan 4 3 20.0 15.0 157.9 2,368.50
Papua New Guinea 26 11.5 33.9 1.1 5.9 6.41
Rwanda 4 7.2 8.3 26.7 9 240.00
São Tomé and Principe 35 11 47.7 0.0 0.2 0.00
Senegal 15 9.6 23.4 11.6 11.7 135.28
Sierra Leone 4 8.2 7.3 27.7 5.5 152.26
Solomon Islands 33 10.3 48.1 0.0 0.5 0.00
Somalia not available not available not available not available 8.2 not available
Sudan 13 10.8 18.1 16.9 36.2 613.39
Tajikistan 3 4.6 9.8 25.2 6.5 163.91
Tanzania 6 9.4 9.6 25.4 38.3 973.80
Timor-Leste 32 8.8 54.5 0.0 0.9 0.00
Togo 5 9.3 8.1 26.9 6.2 167.00
Uganda 6 9.4 9.6 25.4 28.8 732.26
Uzbekistan 10 7.5 20.0 15.0 26.6 399.00
Vietnam 8 5.3 22.6 12.4 84.2 1,040.58
Yemen, Rep. 13 5.4 36.1 0.0 21 0.00
Zambia 12 10 18.0 17.0 11.7 198.90
Zimbabwe 16 9.7 24.7 10.3 13 133.35
Total         29,634.04
aData derived from WHO National Health Account information (see http://www.who.int/nha/en/).
bData derived from WHO population statistics (see http://www.who.int/countries/en/).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0030530.t001
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creation of a world health insurance 
would therefore require: (1) A 
willingness to share health risks and 
the burden of health care between rich 
and poor states; (2) A mechanism to 
allocate resources to poor states; and 
(3) A mechanism to determine the 
contributions from rich states.
Willingness to Share Health Risks 
and the Burden of Health Care
The principal obligation of the 
states that ratiﬁ  ed the Covenant is 
“…to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and 
cooperation, especially economic 
and technical, to the maximum of 
[their] available resources, with a view 
to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant” [6].
In its third general comment, the 
Committee concludes that “a minimum 
core obligation to ensure the satisfaction 
of, at the very least, minimum essential 
levels of each of the rights is incumbent 
upon every State party” [3]. In its 14th 
general comment, the Committee 
deﬁ  nes the core obligations regarding 
the right to health, including the 
obligation to “ensure the right of access 
to health facilities, goods and services 
on a non-discriminatory basis, especially 
for vulnerable or marginalized groups” 
and the obligation to “provide essential 
drugs, as from time to time deﬁ  ned 
under the WHO Action Programme on 
Essential Drugs” [4].
What if a poor state lacks the 
resources to provide such essential 
medicines and health care? The 
obligation to take steps to the 
maximum of its available resources 
refers both to the state’s own resources 
and to those available from the 
international community [7]. The 
Committee has emphasised the duties 
of richer states: “For the avoidance 
of any doubt, it is particularly 
incumbent on State parties and 
other actors in a position to assist, to 
provide ‘international assistance and 
cooperation, especially economic and 
technical’ which enable developing 
countries to fulﬁ  l their core and other 
obligations…” [4].
Accordingly, rich states should 
provide the additional resources poor 
states need to provide a minimum 
level of health care—not as a matter 
of charity, but of meeting their legal 
obligations.
A Mechanism to Allocate 
Resources to Poor States
The state remains the ﬁ  rst duty-bearer 
toward its citizens. Poor states can 
only claim international assistance 
when they are unable to fulﬁ  l their 
obligations on their own.
The Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health of the 
World Health Organization (WHO) 
estimates the minimum budget 
required to ﬁ  nance adequate levels 
of health care in poor countries to 
be US$35 per person per year [8]. 
This estimate is based on priority 
health interventions that do not 
exceed the core obligations as deﬁ  ned 
by the Committee [9]. Therefore, 
governments must spend at least US$35 
per person per year on health care to 
fulﬁ  l their core obligations.
But governments have duties other 
than providing health care. How much 
should they allocate to health care 
to be able to say they have used the 
maximum of their available resources? 
We use the benchmark of 15% of total 
government expenditure adopted 
by African states in the 2001 “Abuja 
Declaration” [10]. In our exercise, if 
15% of total government expenditure 
is insufﬁ  cient, poor states can claim the 
remainder from rich states as Ofﬁ  cial 
Development Assistance (ODA) 
for health, through a world health 
insurance.
Table 1 estimates the remainders 
for 54 low-income countries, based 
on WHO information about national 
health accounts. Six low-income 
countries would not need additional 
ODA for health; for one (Somalia), the 
WHO lacks accurate information. The 
other 47 countries together would need 
about US$30 billion additional ODA 
for health annually.
Claims for additional annual ODA 
for health of US$6 billion (India), 
US$3 billion (Bangladesh), or 
US$2 billion (Ethiopia) might seem 
grotesque. But without additional 
ODA, these countries simply cannot 
reach the expenditure level of US$35 
per person per year, even with an 
allocation for health of 15% of 
their total budgets. Moreover, these 
ﬁ  gures are in line with the estimated 
additional ODA needed to meet all 
the Millennium Development Goals, 
including the health-related ones: 
US$48 billion per year by 2006 and 
US$74 billion by 2015 [11].
Currently, no single agency is 
equipped to deal with ODA claims of 
this magnitude. But if the international 
community is serious about the 
Millennium Development Goals, it 
must ﬁ  nd innovative ways to increase 
ODA for health. The Global Fund 
has demonstrated that it is possible to 
increase ODA for health rapidly and 
in a transparent manner, based on 
country-owned proposals. The World 
Bank provides substantial funding to 
the health sectors of most low-income 
countries. Many of these countries 
have also developed common funding 
mechanisms for the health sector, 
in which several donors pool their 
contributions. A combination of these 
mechanisms would enable ODA for 
health to be increased substantially, 
rapidly, and in a transparent and 
reliable manner. In some countries, 
Global Fund grants are already 
integrated into the health sector 
common fund [12], and the World 
Bank and the Global Fund are working 
together to harmonise their grants 
[13]. The allocation of a substantial 
and open-ended increase of ODA for 
health is entirely feasible.
A Mechanism to Determine the 
Contributions from Rich States
Once we know approximately how 
much poor states require to ensure the 
minimum essential level of the right to 
health, we need to determine which rich 
states should contribute, and how much.
The International Development 
Association (IDA)—the “soft loan 
arm” of the World Bank Group—has 
developed a burden-sharing mechanism 
based on adjusted gross national income 
[14]. The mechanism has no legal 
status, but is widely accepted as fair.
Table 2 lists 40 rich states 
contributing to the 14th replenishment 
of the IDA and estimates how they 
should share the burden of the 
additional ODA for health needed by 
the 47 poor states listed in Table 2.
Again, the bottom line is that burden 
sharing among rich states is a feasible 
way to provide additional ODA for 
health. We do not need to invent a 
world health insurance from scratch; we 
have all the basic requirements already.
Do We Need a World Health 
Insurance?
The creation of the Global Fund 
revolutionised public health 
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policies in low-income countries. 
Previously, the provision of ART in 
low-income countries was dismissed 
as unsustainable. After its creation, 
however, many low-income countries 
shifted their policies almost overnight, 
from a narrow focus on HIV prevention 
to a balanced mixture of prevention 
and treatment.
Was it the amount of available 
funding through the Global Fund 
that revolutionised policies to ﬁ  ght 
HIV/AIDS? Hardly. By May 2006, in 
just over three years, the Global Fund 
had disbursed US$2.26 billion [15]. 
This average of less than US$1 billion 
per year is a drop in the funding ocean 
compared with the overall amount of 
ODA of almost US$100 billion in 2003 
[16]. Even if compared with ODA for 
health (almost US$7 billion in 2003), 
Global Fund funding represents an 
increase of less than 15%. Why did it 
make such a difference?
The answer may lie in the problem of 
sustainability. The Global Fund recently 
closed its sixth call for proposals. The 
guidelines mention:
“The applicant should describe 
how grant-supported activities and 
interventions will…help to establish 
and build sustainable systems 
(including management and ﬁ  nancial 
systems); human resource capacity; 
technical competence; and other 
foundations to support the continuity 
of planned interventions beyond the 
program term, as appropriate” [17].
In other words, the Global Fund 
wants every element of the intervention 
to be sustainable, except the funding 
which it ensures itself.
The Global Fund’s new 
understanding of sustainability—
relying on sustained international 
assistance, not on present or future self-
ﬁ  nancing—seems to have inﬂ  uenced 
the thinking of rich states. The Political 
Declaration on HIV/AIDS adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly 
in June 2006 commits to the “provision 
of funds [for ART] in a sustained 
manner” [18]. This is fundamentally 
different from the earlier commitment 
to “provide [ART] progressively and 
in a sustainable manner”, made in 
the “Declaration of Commitment” 
following the United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session on AIDS in 
June 2001 [19].
The reliability of Global Fund 
funding also helps to overcome 
other obstacles. For decades the 
World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) have imposed 
ceilings on public health expenditure 
[20]. Low-income countries are 
not allowed to “break” the ceiling, 
or to increase their health budgets 
beyond the ceiling, even if they obtain 
additional ODA to cover additional 
expenses. Organisations like the 
WHO have maintained that “Financial 
ceilings…may need to be stretched” 
[21], but the position of the World 
Bank is clear: “[I]t is not prudent for 
countries to commit to permanent 
expenditures for such items as salaries 
for nurses and doctors on the basis 
of uncertain ﬁ  nancing ﬂ  ows from 
Table 2. Burden Sharing of a World Health Insurance
A. Countries 
Contributing to IDA 14
B. Burden-Sharing 
of IDA 14, Percent
C. Burden-Sharing 
of IDA 14, after 
Clearing “Funds 
from Accelerated 
Encashment” and 
“Structural Financing 
Gap”, Percent 
(B/0.8156)
D. Burden-Sharing 
of a World Health 
Insurance, in US$ 
millions (C×296,34)
Australia 1.46 1.79 530.48
Austria 1.56 1.91 566.81
Barbados 0.00 0.00 0.00
Belgium 1.59 1.95 577.71
Brazil 0.61 0.75 221.64
Canada 3.75 4.60 1,362.52
Czech Republic 0.05 0.06 18.17
Denmark 1.21 1.48 439.64
Finland 0.60 0.74 218.00
France 7.20 8.83 2,616.05
Germany 7.96 9.76 2,892.19
Greece 0.12 0.15 43.60
Hungary 0.06 0.07 21.80
Iceland 0.04 0.05 14.53
Ireland 0.37 0.45 134.44
Israel 0.07 0.09 25.43
Italy 3.80 4.66 1,380.69
Japan 11.75 14.41 4,269.24
Korea 0.91 1.12 330.64
Kuwait 0.14 0.17 50.87
Luxembourg 0.18 0.22 65.40
Mexico 0.05 0.06 18.17
Netherlands 2.80 3.43 1,017.35
New Zealand 0.12 0.15 43.60
Norway 1.68 2.06 610.41
Poland 0.03 0.04 10.90
Portugal 0.20 0.25 72.67
Russian Federation 0.14 0.17 50.87
Saudi Arabia 0.22 0.27 79.93
Singapore 0.14 0.17 50.87
Slovak Republic 0.01 0.01 3.63
Slovenia 0.03 0.04 10.90
South Africa 0.08 0.10 29.07
Spain 2.20 2.70 799.35
Sweden 2.96 3.63 1,075.49
Switzerland 2.26 2.77 821.15
Turkey 0.09 0.11 32.70
United Kingdom 12.14 14.88 4,410.95
United States 12.95 15.88 4,705.25
Venezuela 0.03 0.04 10.90
Sub-total 81.56 100.00 29,634.00
Funds from accelerated 
encashment
1.42 0.00 0.00
Structural ﬁ  nancing gap 17.04 0.00 0.00
Total 100.02 100.00 29,634.00
Data derived from [14].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0030530.t002
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development assistance funds” [22]. 
The World Bank and the IMF seem 
willing to make an exception for 
additional ODA coming from the 
Global Fund, however, because it is 
reliable and predictable. In Malawi, 
for example, the government and 
the IMF agreed that “[t]he ceiling on 
central government wages and salaries 
will be adjusted upward (downward) 
by the full amount of donor-funded 
supplementary wages and salaries for 
the health sector that is greater (less) 
than the program baseline” [23].
Improving the reliability of ODA for 
health would also improve the overall 
impact of existing ODA ﬂ  ows. For a 
low-income country it is easier to obtain 
ODA to build a hospital, or technical 
assistance to learn how to run that 
hospital, than for “recurrent costs” like 
the salaries of the medical staff or the 
medicines needed to run the hospital.
If the Global Fund is to deliver 
on its promise of providing reliable 
and predictable funding, it will need 
reliable and predictable contributions 
itself. A burden-sharing mechanism is 
therefore essential. Supporters of the 
Global Fund have been demanding 
such a mechanism since its creation 
[24], as indeed has the Global Fund 
itself [25]. It cannot continue to rely 
on civil society campaigns to make sure 
it receives the resources needed to the 
approved proposals it calls for, as it has 
in 2006 (Figure 1).
Although the Global Fund is 
limited to three diseases, AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria are not 
the only diseases that deserve more 
ambitious interventions. High levels of 
infant mortality caused by severe acute 
malnutrition, for example, have long 
been a cause of fatality in low-income 
countries. The provision of milk paste 
is effective, but its price remains an 
obstacle [26]. Providing milk paste 
in poor health systems, or on poor 
health budgets, will only be possible if 
traditional notions of sustainability are 
rejected in favour of that of sustained 
funding. Mindsets still need to change 
at all levels—even that of the Executive 
Director of UNICEF, who continues 
to insist that effective interventions 
to reduce infant mortality should be 
“phased in according to the ability of 
both the health system to deliver them 
at scale, and of governments to afford 
them and to sustain them in the longer 
term” [27].
A Lesson for Health 
Nongovernmental Organisations
The creation of a world health 
insurance is a matter for governments, 
not for nongovernmental organisations 
(NGOs). But the lesson for NGOs is 
that a world health insurance, or any 
similar arrangement to increase ODA 
for health in a reliable and predictable 
manner, does not need to be invented 
from scratch.
Our view sheds a different light on 
the traditional notions of sustainability 
that inform many NGOs’ health-care 
interventions—that recurrent costs 
should be covered locally and that 
governments should be able to sustain 
them in the longer term. There is no 
international law stipulating that ODA 
should be limited in time, or that 
local resources should cover recurrent 
costs. On the contrary, international 
law requires that rich states assist poor 
states to meet the minimum essential 
level of the right to health.
NGOs could advocate for the 
creation of a world health insurance 
while continuing to align their 
interventions with traditional ideas 
about sustainability. Or they could 
act as if a world health insurance 
existed already and focus on delivering 
effective health interventions. We 
would argue that it was the provision 
of ART in low-income countries that 
forced rich and poor states to ﬁ  nd a 
solution for the sustained ﬁ  nancing of 
ART, not the other way around. Other 
effective health interventions deserve a 
similar strategy.  
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